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Abstract: My article discusses the possibility to use philosophical practice as a 
tool for scientific research. It departs from the claim that there are stages in the 
development of the sciences when philosophy reemerges. This happens when the 
sciences face open questions calling for a restructuring of the scientific 
framework. It is suggested that the methods of philosophical practice may turn 
out useful in such a process.   
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Resumen: Este artículo discute la posibilidad de usar la Filosofía Aplicada como 
un instrumento para la investigación científica. Parte del hecho de que existen 
fases en el desarrollo de las ciencias en que la filosofía renace. Esto sucede 
cuando las ciencias se enfrentan a cuestiones abiertas que exigen una 
reestructuración del marco científico. Se sugiere que el método de la Filosofía 
Aplicada podría ser giro oportuno para tal proceso. 
Palabras clave: mayeútica, cambio científico, diálogo socrático, preguntas 
abiertas.  
 
 
Introduction: Philosophy as the mother of science 
 
Philosophy has often been called the mother of sciences. Although 
the grounds for this contention seldom are stated very clearly, it 
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would seem to be based on at least three assumptions. First, that 
philosophy and science share a common ground by involving a 
rational approach to the world. Second, that there has been a 
historical development in which the principal sciences, one by one, 
have emerged from within philosophy. Third, that philosophy and 
the sciences are different enough to make their separation 
unquestionable. This difference has often been understood as the 
opposition between the purely rational and the empirical, or the 
contrast between the speculative and the systematical.  
 The sequel of this account of the birth of the sciences is a 
modern, shrunken conception of philosophy, according to which 
philosophy becomes a matter of purely historical concern, or is 
transformed into a highly specialized non-empirical science (one 
example being the idea of philosophy as logics). In both cases, a 
radical separation between philosophy and the empirical sciences is 
implied, although some space is left for interdisciplinary research 
involving philosophy in the shape of a scientific discipline 
 Now, I do not want to put in question that the “standard 
account” of how philosophy has been a mother to the sciences has 
some historical truth. It does not, however, form the whole picture. 
I want to argue that there also is another, more subtle way in which 
philosophy may give birth to science. Furthermore, this second 
birth giving does not confine itself to a, more or less, delimited 
momement in history. Rather, it may be viewed as process of 
ongoing delivery. What I have in mind is the way in which 
philosophy may reemerge within any science engaged in scientific 
rethinking. Understanding the very nature of this process will be 
the first task of my paper. 
 My second claim is that the reemergence of philosophy in the 
course of scientific thinking involves a process in which 
philosophical practice might turn out useful. Obviously, however, 
the involvement of philosophical practice in scientific research 
would run the risk of turning the former into a mere technique for 
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the scientist’s toolbox, running against practitioners traditional 
ambition of promoting the good life Some of this tension may, I 
will argue, however, be relieved by the realization that engaging in 
philosophical practice will also affect the self-understanding of 
science itself, fostering a greater awareness of the limitations and 
conditionality of science. Finally, I will turn to some remarks on 
the value of philosophical practice in the education of scientists.  
Before proceeding, let me say some words about my 
background. My knowledge of the science part stems from nearly 
30 years of giving basic university courses in the philosophy of 
science at the University of Helsinki, together with an early career 
as a student of physics and chemistry. The training in philosophical 
practice I have goes back to some ten years as a member of a 
Finnish society for philosophical activity named Interbaas, which 
specializes in Neo-Socratic dialogue 
1
. The present article may be 
seen as a first step to bring together my experience of science 
education with my knowledge of philosophy of science and 
philosophical practice. Thus, it should be seen as reflections 
shaping a possible domain for fruitful interaction, and not as an 
report of actual experience of combining scientific research with 
the methods of philosophical practice. As already indicated, I am 
also aware of the possibly tensions such an interaction might create 
from the point of view of philosophical practice, which its 
traditional commitment to serving the good life. 
  
 
Philosophy at the border between the closed and the open  
 
My first claim is, thus, that philosophy may reemerge within a 
science engaged in rethinking matters. But when does this happen, 
                                                          
1
 See ÖSTERMAN, Bernt: “Neo-Socratic Dialogue as a Paradigmatic Setting for 
Philosophizing”, Philosophical Practice, 3, 9, New York, 2014, pp. 1426-1435. 
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and what does it involve? In general, we are speaking about 
situations were the very framework of a branch of research is 
challenged. In order to clarify what is at stake, I will use a 
distinction between closed and open questions made by Martin 
Hollis as my point of departure
2
.  
According to Hollis, a closed question is a question we know 
how to settle. Another way to put it, is that it is poses a question 
within a certain framework. This does not imply that we currently 
have to be in a position to answer such a question. The crucial thing 
is whether we can say that the question, at least in principle, might 
be answered
3
. Here is an example of how I understand the way 
closed questions may be manifested within the sciences. Some 
years ago I was present at a talk given by a physicist concerning the 
present state of particle physics. I remember him saying something 
like the following: “We do not yet know how...” followed by 
surprisingly detailed description of what it, in fact, was that wasn’t 
known, suggesting that it only was a matter of time until thing 
would become clear. I take the example, with its claim to know the 
unknown, to be typical for any research area guided by a strong 
framework. 
In contradistinction to closed questions, open questions are 
questions which we do not know how to go about with. This could 
                                                          
2
 HOLLIS, Martin: Invitation to Philosophy, Blackwell, Oxford 1985. As will 
become obvious there is an obvious affinity between Hollis’ discussion of 
emerging open questions and what Thomas Kuhn says about the occurrence of 
anomalies in science in his ground breaking book The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (KUHN, Thomas: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
University Press, Chicago, 1970). Roughly, closed questions are what 
characterizes what Kuhn calls a normal science, whereas open questions are 
typical of a science in crisis. My reason for preferring to use Hollis’ terminology 
to Kuhn’s is that it seems more useful for describing the role played by 
philosophy in the process.     
3
 HOLLIS, Martin: Invitation to Philosophy, Blackwell, Oxford 1985, p. 5. 
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also be expressed by saying that they lack a framework, or are 
posed outside of a such. Still, we should not think about typical 
open questions as being merely free floating speculation. Rather, 
they should be seen as questions which cannot be treated within 
some particular, establishes framework, thus putting it to the test, 
or as Hollis writes: 
 
A closed question asks for information within an existing framework 
and, at some indefinite point, such requests challenge the framework 
itself. At that point an open question is posed, one which also wonders 
how it is to be answered.
4
 
 
Hollis’s own examples focuses on major changes in world view, 
such as the passage from a geocentric universe supported by the 
Church to the by now familiar view of the earth circulating the sun. 
Readers familiar with the writings of Thomas Kuhn, will, of 
course, immediately regognize the last quote as a description of the 
first phase of radical scientific change, or what Kuhn preferred to 
call scientific revolutions or paradigm shifts. To illustrate the 
dynamics between closure and openness inherent in Hollis’s 
account I will choose one of the cases that were also studied by 
Kuhn, the discovery of oxygen in the 18
th
 century, associated with 
the fall of the phlogiston theory of combustion
5
. 
 Roughly, the phlogiston theory was the idea adhered to in the 
first half of the 18
th
 century, that something (a substance) was lost 
to a body in the process of burning, or to a metal in the related 
process of calcination. It went back to the ancient assumption that, 
when something burns, there is a substance escaping from the body 
in the fluttering flames. The framework presupposed by the theory 
could, qualitatively, account for, for instance, such observations 
                                                          
4
 HOLLIS, Martin: Invitation to Philosophy, Blackwell, Oxford 1985, p. 17. 
5
 My account is based on BUTTERFIELD, Herbert: The Origins of Modern 
Science 1300 – 1800. Revised edition, The Free Press, New York, 1965, Ch. 11. 
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that a metal could be recovered from the calcinated metal by 
heating it in the presence of charcoal – supposedly, as a process of 
regaining the phlogiston that had been lost. Hence, the question 
“why does a calx return to the metal when heated with charcoal” 
may be viewed as closed under the framework of the phlogiston 
theory
6
. The observation that challenged this framework was, 
however, the fact that a calcinated (i.e. dephlogistonized) metal was 
heavier than the uncalcinated metal. For how could this be, if 
calcination is a process were a substance escapes from the metal? 
Thus, the question “why is dephlogistonized metal heavier than the 
original metal” is open under the framework.  
Now, logically at least, there are several ways of closing this 
question. The actual path followed by chemistry was to abandon 
the assumption that combustion and calcination involved the 
escaping of a substance, to replace it with the idea that something, 
in fact, was added to the object in the process (eventually this 
turned out to be oxygen). Another suggestion prevalent at the time 
was, however, the idea that the weight of the calcinated metal 
increased because phlogiston is a substance with “negative 
weight”, implying that a loss of it might, indeed, result in an 
increase of the weight of its host. The latter proposal has, of course, 
later become known as one of the standard text book examples of 
suspicious ad hoc hypotheses, i.e. the attempt to make amendments 
to a theory simply in order to save it from a particular refutation
7
. 
But as an effort to reform the metaphysics of science it was, 
undeniably, brave.  
The downfall of the phlogiston theory may be seen as an 
example of how the framework of a branch of science (i.e. the early 
chemistry of the 18
th
 century) is deranged by the occurrence of an 
                                                          
6
 According to the Free Dictionary a calx is “the crumby residue left after a 
mineral has been calcinated or roasted”.  
7
 See e.g. HEMPEL, Carl: Philosophy of Natural Science, Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, 1966, 29-30. 
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open question (how the weight of an object may increase by 
calcination) leading to a radical restructuring (the understanding of 
combustion as an additive process instead of a subtractive) 
eventually turning the recalcitrant question into a closed one. But 
what does philosophy have to do with this process? According to 
Hollis philosophy is, in fact, absolutely vital for the dynamics of 
the open and the closed – or as he expresses it, “the work of 
philosophy is at the shifting border between closed and open”. This 
sounds good, but how, exactly, is it to be understood?  
 
 
The role of philosophy in radical scientific change 
 
Let us start by asking how open questions are related to 
philosophical questions. I think the answer simply is that 
philosophical questions which are questions which are open in 
relation to prevailing frameworks of thought. Obvious examples of 
traditional philosophical questions open in this way are, for 
instance, questions related to the knowledge of the external world. 
Take for instance a question like “how do I know that the tree I see 
over there really is there?”, which is open in relation to our 
ordinary framework for establishing the existence of things (e.g. by 
using our senses). But, and this, clearly, is Hollis’ view, some 
questions which apparently sound scientific, may, covertly, contain 
a philosophical dimension (in proportion to the degree to which 
they are open). His favorite example is the question “Is there 
conscious life elsewhere in the universe?”, where the difficulty is 
related to what possibly would count as being conscious
8
.  
 Thus, it clearly makes sense, to localize the birth of 
philosophical questions to what Hollis calls “the shifting border 
between the closed and the open”. And where there are 
                                                          
8
 HOLLIS, Martin: Invitation to Philosophy, Blackwell, Oxford 1985, pp. 1-2. 
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philosophical questions there is, naturally, a place for “the work of 
philosophy”. But how, precisely, does philosophy act on these 
questions? I think we can say that philosophy explores possible 
ways of restructuring the framework in relation to which a question 
appears to be open.  We should, however, recognize that the 
philosophical work in connection with radical scientific change, in 
particular, does not presuppose the involvement of a professional 
philosopher. Normally, what actually happens when a science 
recloses its questions by successfully altering its framework is, 
clearly, that there is a single scientist who suddenly excels in a 
philosophical thinking (in the case of the phlogiston theory it was 
Lavoisier)
9
.  
 In principle, it would still seem possible that professional 
philosophers could be called in to help with such cases, armored 
with the special knoweldge and skills the philosophical expert is 
expected to have (I am now, of course, thinking of philosophy in 
the shrunken, modern sense). Perhaps there are such cases, but I 
would be surprised if they were very common (I have, of course, 
heard of logicians and mathematicians helping each other, but I am 
now mainly interested in the contribution philosophy might give to 
empirical sciences). Still, however, the mere fact that scientists are 
the ones that might be expected to do the philosophical thinking 
required in radical scientific change, does not imply that there 
would be no room for professional philosophers in a wider sense. 
In fact, we here seem to have a clear space for philosophy as 
                                                          
9
 “At this moment there emerged one of those men who can stand above the 
whole scene, look at the confused pieces of the jig-saw puzzle and see a way of 
turning them into a pattern. He was Lavoisier, and it is difficult not to believe 
that he towers above all the rest and belongs to the small group of giants who 
have the highest place in the story of the scientific revolution”, Butterfield, 
somewhat pathetically, writes in a passage that surely sounds like the 
intervention of a “great philosopher”, see BUTTERFIELD, Herbert: The Origins 
of Modern Science 1300 – 1800. Revised edition, The Free Press, New York, 
1965, p. 217. 
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midwifery, or the ancient idea of helping people to give birth to 
philosophical insights. Thus, perhaps, it is not at all the modern 
academic philosopher the perplexed scientist should turn to, but the 
modern philosophical midwifes, the brave men and women that 
nowadays are called philosophical practitioners?  
Given the characterization of philosophical practice offered in 
a recent basic book in the field, the suggestion would at least seem 
worth considering. In the Prologue to the brand new Socratic 
Handbook Michael Noah Weiss describes the task of a 
philosophical practitioner as follows:  
 
Socrates understood a philosopher’s role to assist in this delivery 
[when the soul is pregnant and wants to give birth] ... If we go along 
with this Socratic “work attitude”, a philosopher’s job is to support 
others on how to wonder, give birth to new ideas, and with that to 
change perspective and to think differently
10
.  
 
Now, clearly, this sounds exactly as the kind of help a science 
facing a set of open question threatening its framework needs! But 
exactly how should the philosophical practitioners support be 
conducted? I will now turn to some reflections on this subject.  
 
 
Two modes of philosophical practice 
 
I will begin by suggesting a distinction between two basic ways in 
which philosophical practice may be conducted. The first I call 
Questioning and the second Dialogue. They stand for different 
modes of interaction between the practitioner and the client(s), and, 
normally, also involve different numbers of participants. Thus, 
                                                          
10
 WEISS, Michael Noah: “Prologue: Think Different”, in WEISS, Michael 
Noah (ed.): The Socratic Handbook, Lit Verlag, Wien, 2015, p. 5, my italics. 
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whereas the typical setting for a Questioning only would involve 
the practitioner and one client, I think of a Dialogue as involving at 
least two participants other than the practitioner (who usually 
would be called a facilitator). It should, however, be added that the 
two methods, despite of representing different modes of 
philosophical practice, do not exclude one another, in fact a 
combination of the two may sometimes turn out fruitful.  
Basically, Questioning is the activity were the primary 
objective is to get clear about the presuppositions and patterns 
inherent in a clients way of thinking and behaving. As the name 
already indicates, the basic technique is to work through a structure 
of questions and answers, where the practitioner assumes the role 
of the interrogator. In philosophical practice Questioning is an 
important part of the branch called philosophical counseling, which 
usually is initiated by an existential problem encountered by the 
client. Thus, the idea of helping the client to solve a particular 
problem usually forms an integral part of the process. 
Now, as the reader may have noticed, Questioning looks very 
much like the kind of process Socrates subjects his interlocutors to 
in Plato’s Dialogues. Thus, trivially it would seem, what I call 
Questioning certainly falls under the concept of a Socratic 
Dialogue, some may even want to see it is as the very paradigm 
example of such an activity. So, what is the point of making a 
distinction between this activity, and Dialogue (or Dialogue 
proper)?  
What I have in mind is a distinction that, if not always 
observed, clearly, is there to be made in philosophical practice. It is 
certainly present in ordinary language. For wouldn’t one of the 
reactions to a Socrates appearing in modern society be that he is not 
actually speaking, or genuinely in dialogue, with his interlocutors, 
suggesting that he is not involving himself in the discussion? Or, if 
my example appears too imaginative, think of the way we may 
react similarly to any present day therapist, standing in a “clinical” 
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realation to his, or her, clients (psychologists, doctors, marriage 
counselors, and the like). Thus, as opposed to the mode of 
questioning directed from one part to another, I want to reserve the 
term Dialogue for a conversational mode characterized by equality 
and a mutual interest. To this we may add the condition of working 
together towards a shared goal. 
As my primary example of a Dialogue I take Neo-Socratic 
Dialogue. Basically, this is a form of dialogue initiated by Leonard 
Nelson, and developed further by his pupil Gustaf Heckmann
11
. It 
should, however, be noted that that there are some different 
versions of similar dialogues around. Neo-Socratic Dialogue is also 
used for various purposes
12
. I am myself mostly familiar with at 
version in which the idea is that a group (ideally 8-10 persons) 
analyzes a concept, or a phenomenon, based on personal 
experiences recounted by the participants. But it is also, for 
instance, possible to start from a particular question. 
The most pertinent feature of  Neo-Socratic Dialogue is a set of 
rules which govern the discussion which may be summarized a 
follows: 
 
I. Think for yourself! 
R1: References to authorities are forbidden. 
II. Think here and now! 
R2: Avoid bringing your already established views to the discussion. 
R3: Be prepared to give up your previous views on a subject. 
 
                                                          
11
 See specifically NELSON, Leonard: Socratic Philosophy and Critical 
Philosophy. Selected Essays, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1949, CH. 1 
and HECKMANN, Gustaf: Das Sokratische Gespräch. Erfahrungen in 
philosopischen Hochschulseminaren, Hermann Schroedel Verlag KG, Hannover, 
1981. 
12
 ”Neo-Socratic Dialogue is today used in many different contexts and strives to 
realize several goals simultaneously”, Helge Svare writes in SVARE, Helge: Den 
gode samtalen. Kunsten å skape dialog, Pax Forlag, Oslo 2008, p. 159 (my 
translation from the original Norwegian).  
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III. Think together! 
R4: Keep to the subject. 
R5: Listen to others. 
R6: Encourage the thinking of others. 
R7: Avoid dominating the discussion. 
R8: Try to look at every statement as a contribution to a discussion. 
IV. Stay close to life! 
 
As I have described elsewhere, a discussion governed by these 
rules form, I believe, an ideal setting for philosophizing by 
liberating the thoughts of the participants and positioning them for 
creative interaction
13
. 
 Questioning and Dialogue are different in many respects. As 
already indicated Questioning is normally a process involving only 
one client (in the case of Socrates there may, of course, be many, 
but one gets the impression that they are standing in a row, so to 
say). Dialogue involves many participants working together on a 
question. Both modes of practice are certainly true to the Socratic 
ideal of the philosopher as ignorant, but in different ways. In 
Questioning the practitioner assumes the position of an 
interrogator, whereas in Dialogue the practitioner acts as a 
facilitator of a dialogue between others (in Neo-Socratic Dialogue 
this, for instance, means to supervise the observance of the rules). 
Whereas Questioning is directed towards disclosing personal 
patterns of thought, Dialogue deals with what is shared by a 
community. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 ÖSTERMAN, Bernt: “Neo-Socratic Dialogue as a Paradigmatic Setting for 
Philosophizing”, Philosophical Practice, 3, 9, New York, 2014, spec. pp. 1428-
1431. 
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Philosophical practice in scientific research  
 
Let us pause for a minute to take stock of what, so far, has been 
said. I have argued that philosophy’s birth giving to the sciences 
should not be seen as confined to a, once and for all, closed set of 
historical moments. On the contrary, we are dealing with an 
ongoing process occasioned by the emergence of open questions 
challenging the frameworks of the sciences. These reemerging 
windows for philosophy, however, do not normally imply that the 
scientist may take the liberty to hand over a bunch of philosophical 
problems to a professional philosopher and go on holiday. Rather, 
it calls for a capacity for philosophical thinking within the 
community of scientists. Still, there appears to be a space for 
philosophical intervention, but not with the philosopher in the role 
of a distinguished adviser or specialist to whom certain difficult 
questions may be trusted. What is required is for someone to step 
into the shoes (or sandals) of the legendary Socrates by assuming 
the part of an intellectual midwife. This brought us close to the 
domain of the activity that today is called philosophical practice. In 
the preceding section I have offered a distinction between two basic 
modes of philosophical practice and now is the time to apply the 
discussion to scientific research.  
Now, as already stated in the introduction, my article is not 
based on any experience of working with scientist engaged in the 
restructuring of their field of knowledge (we should also remember 
that such cases are rare). In fact, I do not know of anyone else who 
has attempted something exactly like this either. Consequently, I 
cannot do more than offer some remarks that, maximally, will serve 
a sketchy indications of how things might work out in a domain 
that certainly still is in a pristine stage.  
In drawing the distinction between Questioning and Dialogue I 
have already, more or less tacitly, assumed a certain division of 
labor. Thus, Questioning is the form of activity primarily aimed at 
BERNT ÖSTERMAN 
 
HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 7, 2016, pp. 89-109 
102 
 
disclosing a framework, whereas Dialogue is the activity in which a 
framework is changed
14
. Now, this may look as an simplification, 
as it, to some extent, probably is. Hence, a process of Questioning 
may certainly initiate a change, similarly it does not seem 
impossible that a Dialogue also may result in a stronger awareness 
of the framework one is working under. Still, I believe that such 
outcomes often would appear as a blending of practices (which, of 
course, might be highly desirable). Thus, for example, a 
Questioning leading to a radical restructuring of thought might also 
include dialogical elements, where the process of questions and 
answers is nurtured by a growing mutual understanding of what is 
at stake (meaning that the questioner starts to enter increasingly 
dialogically into the proceedings). This being said, I will now 
attempt to offer a sketch of how the methods of philosophical 
practice might be applied to promote radical scientific change. For 
sake of simplicity, I will not try to enter an ongoing scientific 
dispute, but stick to the historical case of the decline of the 
phlogiston theory presented above, assuming that this is 
sufficiently like anything that might presently be going on (like the 
question of dark matter in astrophysics).  
                                                          
14
 It may be noted, that there is a certain affinity between my distinction between 
functions of Questioning and Dialogue and “the two visions of philosophical 
practice” Ran Lahav has described as follows: “In the first vision, philosophy is a 
tool for solving personal problems. In the second vision, philosophy is a journey 
towards new horizons of life. The first vision tries to make our Platonic cave 
comfortable and problem-free. The second vision encourages us to step out of 
our Platonic cave. The first wants to adjust us to normal life. The second offers 
to awaken us from normal life” (LAHAV, Ran: “Two Visions of Philosophical 
Practice”, available in www.philopractice.org/the-vision-of-philosophical-
practice/item/146-6-two-visions-of-philosophical-practice.htm, last access 
October 30th, 2015). In particular, of course, encouraging the “stepping out of 
the cave” is, precisely, the role I am tentatively assigning to philosophical 
practice as a contribution to scientific research, 
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So, let us start by assuming that there is a community of 
scientists adhering to the phlogiston theory of combustion, 
according to which a substance called phlogiston escapes from a 
body that burns, or is calcinated. Let us continue by assuming that 
the theory is confirmed by a number of experiments, such as 
regaining a metal from a calx by heating it in the presence of 
charcoal. There is, however, also an experimental outcome that 
doesn’t seem to fit the picture at all, i.e. a persistent increase in 
weight registered for any instance of a calcinated metal. The 
community of chemists are facing an open question: why does a 
metal get heavier through a process of calcination?  
Now, let us add the assumption that the particular scientific 
community is lucky enough to have intellectual midwifes around, 
whom the scientists turn to in their distress. What should such a 
practitioner do? Following the division of labor that has been 
assumed above, the first step would be to use Questioning to help 
the community in disclosing the framework of the phlogiston 
theory. What are, for instance, the assumptions of the nature of 
phlogiston inherent in the theory? Is it a substance just like any 
other, or of a very special kind? And what kind of beliefs about 
substances are prevalent among the chemists in question (and so 
on)?  
From this we move to Dialogue. A number of colleagues 
working on the issue of the strange increase in the weight of a 
metal through calcination are invited for a discussion under the 
guidance of the practitioner, who now would switch from 
questioner to being a facilitator of a Socratic-type dialogue. To 
simplify, we may assume that it starts right from the crucial 
question, i.e. “why does a metal get heavier through a process of 
calcination?” The task of the facilitator is to eliminate some 
common hazards to a philosophical dialogue like competitiveness, 
prestige, dominant natures, shyness, reliance on authority, or mere 
stubbornness of human beings. This he, or she, would, of course, 
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do by surveying adherence to a set of discussion rules. These 
might, I believe, look very much like the rules of Neo-Socratic 
Dialogue listed above, with one obvious exception: the fourth 
imperative, “Stay close to life!” would not seem to make much 
sense in this context (I will return to this seemingly innocent move 
in the following section).  
Before closing my imaginative example I would like to add a 
suggestion concerning how Questioning and Dialogue might be 
combined in a case like this. An important imperative of the Neo-
Socratic dialogue is the idea that the participants should bring as 
little as possible with them to the discussion (captured in the rules 
R1 and R2 above). Now, the presuppositions disclosed in the 
process of Questioning may be understood, precisely, as the set of 
assumptions the scientist may have to abandon to regain the closure 
of his, or her, field. Most importantly, however, it should be 
possible to advance piecemeal. Thus, we may envisage a situation 
where the initial Questioning would result in the list of, say, three 
presupposition of the theory under examination, P1, P2 and P3. By 
tentatively abstaining from all three of them, we would get a 
maximally liberated philosophizing on the subject at hand. It might, 
however, be more fruitful to proceed by abstaining from the 
presuppositions one by one, with a keen eye for tensions created 
among our most deeply entrenched beliefs in subsequent 
discussion. If all this sounds too neat for a real life situation, we 
may add the possibility that some parts of the framework are 
disclosed only gradually through the Dialogue (we may also 
assume that the facilitator is able to switch from one mode to 
another in the living process by asking the right questions at the 
right moment). To illustrate, we may assume that imaginary group 
of phlogistonists with access to an intellectual midwife at some 
point of the Dialogue would come to a point were they also try to 
abstain from the basic assumption that combustion, and calcination, 
basically involves a substance escaping from the body (on the way 
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perhaps even passing through the stage of bracketing the 
presupposition that weights only can be positive).   
For sake of clarity, it should perhaps be added that I am at no 
point suggesting that problems of science could be solved by 
Questioning and Dialogue alone. The ultimate test of any 
intellectual innovation belonging to science, of course, remains 
empirical. 
 
 
The perspective of philosophical practice  
 
Although my suggestions admittedly have been very sketchy, I 
hope that I have been able to convince my reader that there, indeed, 
could be cases where applying the methods of philosophical 
practice in scientific research actually might make sense, not to say 
be fruitful. So far, I have not, however, said anything about how 
this all might look from the point of view of the philosophical 
practitioner. Is giving a helping hand to scientific research in the 
suggested way something the philosophical practitioners would like 
to do? And would they be able? I will start with the latter question. 
Philosophical practice, as we know it, does not require any 
specialized theoretical knowledge. Being able to ask the right 
questions, and observing things like that a participant is keeping to 
the subject in a dialogue, do not require any other knowledge than 
what follows from sharing a culture and language with the clients. 
Acting as an midwife of scientific thinking in a philosophical mode 
would, naturally, be an entirely different thing. Clearly, any 
successful intervention would require at least some scientific 
training. Consequently, it would suddenly be reasonable to talk, for 
instance, of philosophical practitioners specializing in physics, 
chemistry, biology, or the like.  
   But getting involved with science would also seem to bring in 
ideological considerations. Whatever philosophical practice else 
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may be, there is a strong historical connection with the idea of 
promoting the good life. A philosophical practice reduced to a – 
however unique – tool of scientific research search seems difficult 
to reconcile with this ideal. In fact, we already saw that the 
requirement of staying close to life associated with Neo-Socratic 
Dialogue does not seem to have any significance in the application 
to scientific reserach we have been discussing. The traditional goal 
of creating, or restoring, meaning to people by examining their 
lives, simply seems worlds apart from a practice focused on being a 
technique to trigger scientific development. Another, related 
argument, may, I think, be derived from the opposition between, on 
the one hand, the inherently valuable character of at least some 
forms of philosophical practice and, on the other hand, the strong 
instrumentality of a practice ultimately aiming at solving scientific 
problems
15
.  
 It might, however, also be argued that the line I am drawing 
between an ethically oriented philosophical practice and the 
envisaged philosophical practice-like activity performing 
midwifery of radical scientific ideas, is too sharp. A method 
partially aimed at bringing frameworks of thinking into view will, I 
want to argue, inevitably also affect the perception of things. Thus, 
it seems clear that an encounter between philosophical practice and 
scientific research also would affect the way the participating 
scientists understand science and scientific research. Minimally, 
this would involve an improved awareness of the conditions 
presupposed by the scientific activity in question. Probably, it 
would also be a cure against scientism by contributing to a better 
understanding of the very nature of science, and its place in the 
world.   
 
                                                          
15
 See ÖSTERMAN, Bernt.: “Neo-Socratic Dialogue as a Paradigmatic Setting 
for Philosophizing”, Philosophical Practice, 3, 9, New York, 2014, spec. pp. 
1427 and 1433. 
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Conclusions 
 
The article started from the suggestion that the contention that 
philosophy is the mother of the sciences may be understood in two 
different ways. On the “standard account” it describes the actual 
historical roots of the various scientific disciplines we have today. 
According to this, the sciences are offspring of philosophy, which 
certainly preserve some features of their origin, such as a “rational 
outlook”, but still continue to develop in a clearly separate grove. I 
have, however, attempted to show that there also is another, more 
subtle, way in which philosophy reemerges in the sciences. This 
happens when the framework of a science is challenged by the 
occurrence of open questions, characterized by the bewilderment of 
not knowing the way to go on. In general, the solution does, 
however, not call for professional philosophers, but scientists 
excelling in philosophical thinking. As I have indicated, it, 
however, seems reasonable to think that such a process might be 
facilitated my invoking “intellectual midwifes”, applying some of 
the methods known from philosophical practice. In particular, I 
have suggested that a science in turmoil might profit from the 
methods I have identified as Questioning and Dialogue. 
 Now, as brought up in the last section, combining interests with 
the sciences may give rise to some friction with the ideology of the 
movement of philosophical practice. For what happens to the grand 
objectives of  promoting the good life by helping people to solve 
their problems, and perhaps sometimes even to show them a way 
out of their personal cave
16
? Adding the quite obvious requirement 
that the practitioner would benefit from a thorough knowledge of 
the scientific field he, or she, is entering, it will start to look like we 
                                                          
16
 LAHAV, Ran: “Two Visions of Philosophical Practice”, available in 
www.philopractice.org/the-vision-of-philosophical-practice/item/146-6-two-
visions-of-philosophical-practice.htm (last access October 30th, 2015). 
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are simply creating a new field of practical expertise, which only 
happens to borrow some ingredients from philosophical practice. 
Not quite so, however. As indicated at the end of the last section, 
engaging in methods like Questioning and Dialogue would, 
inevitably I believe, not only enhance the creative powers of 
scientists, but also affect their perspective on what they are doing.  
 Consequently, my discussion also points towards a positive 
conclusion. There should be much to be gained from invoking the 
methods of philosophical practice in the education of scientists at 
the universities. What I am envisaging is a scientific training where 
Questioning and Dialogue would appear not only as exclusive 
techniques brought in at the decisive moments of science, but 
rather as a lasting feature of everyday education.  It would involve 
learning how to answer and how to put questions, how to fruitfully 
participate in well-organized dialogues in order to genuinely think 
together, and how to conduct thought-experiments on what might 
be the case. To develop the utterly important skill of doing science 
with a distance. 
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